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Abstract Institutional distance has been known to be an important driver of
Multinational Enterprises’ strategies and performance in host countries. Based on a
large panel dataset of 10,562 firms operating in 17 emerging markets and spanning
80 home countries, we re-examine the relationship described by Gaur and Lu (J
Manage 33(1):84–110, 2007) between regulatory institutional distance and sub-
sidiary performance. We extend this research by (1) examining this relationship in
the context of emerging markets, (2) examining the moderating effects of ownership
strategy and host-country experience within the context of emerging markets and (3)
accounting for a greater variety of institutions by including a large number of home
and host countries. We find that institutional distance negatively affects subsidiary
performance in emerging markets. Our findings also show that the negative effects
of institutional distance on subsidiary performance are lesser for subsidiaries with
partial ownership (than for subsidiaries with full ownership) and for subsidiaries
with greater host-country experience. We discuss our findings with respect to Gaur
and Lu’s model, which explores the relationships between these variables in a
general context.
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1 Introduction
Institutional distance, defined as the difference between the regulatory, cognitive and
normative environments (Scott 1995) of the home and host countries of multinational
enterprises (MNEs), has been known to be of great importance to international
business scholars and managers (Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Xu and Shenkar 2002).
Formal (or regulatory) institutional distance increases MNEs’ costs associated with
learning the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990) of new environments. Such liabilities of
foreignness (Zaheer 1995) are likely to act as sources of competitive disadvantage to
MNEs (Eden and Miller 2004; Miller and Eden 2006). Although, in some industries,
the increasing standardisation of practices has been argued to reduce the effect of
cross-country institutional differences (Brunsson et al. 2012; Larsen and Manning
2015), institutional distance has been argued to affect various important decisions such
as MNEs’ choice of location (Xu and Shenkar 2002), entry mode (Schwens et al.
2011), and ownership strategy (Eden and Miller 2004), and it remains an important
concept in the analysis of foreign subsidiaries’ performance (Gaur and Lu 2007).
Gaur and Lu (2007) argue that although there are disadvantages to operating in
countries with different regulatory institutions, distant regulatory environments
provide opportunities for institutional arbitrage. For example, in the United States,
many MNEs from weaker institutions establish research and development centres to
benefit from superior intellectual property protection regimes. However, at high
levels of institutional distance, Gaur and Lu (2007) argue that the scope of such
arbitrage becomes narrower, resulting in declining advantages. As regulatory
institutional distance increases, subsidiaries face greater ‘unfamiliarity and
relational hazards’ that negatively impact subsidiary performance. In line with this
argument, Gaur and Lu (2007) have found an inverted-U-shaped relationship
between regulatory institutional distance and foreign subsidiary survival.
In our paper, we first suggest that emerging markets provide unique and
important contexts for re-examining the effect of regulatory institutional distance on
foreign affiliates’ performance. The reason is that in comparison to developed
countries, emerging markets have lesser developed, complex and changing formal
institutions that pose greater challenges for MNEs from distant institutions (Ionascu
et al. 2004; Meyer et al. 2009; Meyer and Nguyen 2005). However, over the past
decade, many emerging markets have shown significant development in institutions
that minimise bureaucracy in foreign direct investment (FDI), increase transparency
in business-government communication, protect intellectual property, and minimise
corruption in business transactions (Hoskisson et al. 2013; Luo 2007). Simultane-
ously, over the past decade, investments by other developing countries in emerging
markets have substantially increased, alongside continuing investments by devel-
oped countries1 (UNCTAD 2015). As emerging markets continue to develop their
institutions, MNEs from countries with weaker formal institutions are likely to face
greater institutional differences while operating in emerging markets. Examining
the link between regulatory institutional distance and the subsidiary performance of
1 For instance, South–South FDI between 2009 and 2013 grew by 66 % (i.e., from $1.7 trillion in 2009 to
$2.9 trillion in 2013) and has been speculated to grow at higher rates (UNCTAD 2015).
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MNEs within the specific context of emerging markets can therefore add valuable
insights to the existing research in this area.
Various factors have been argued to moderate the relationship between institutional
distance and MNEs’ subsidiary performance. These include entry mode or subsidiary
ownership strategies (Gaur and Lu 2007), host-country experience (Carlsson et al.
2005; Delios and Beamish 2001; Gaur and Lu 2007), and MNE’s international
diversity (Chao and Kumar 2010). Among these, subsidiary ownership strategies and
host-country experience have been argued to be the most important. Gaur and Lu
(2007) argue that in distant regulatory environments, tightly controlling subsidiary
operations via full ownership increases the probability of subsidiary survival. In this
context, our second argument is that the moderating effect of ownership strategy can
be different in the case of emerging markets. In emerging markets, the importance of
embedding in socio-political circles, production networks, and business-government
communication channels allows MNEs to gain important intangible resources such as
local legitimacy and local reputation (Meyer et al. 2009) and is thus likely to reduce the
negative effects of institutional distance. Extending prior research (Gaur and Lu 2007)
on the moderating effect of subsidiary ownership in the context of emerging markets
can therefore provide new insights. We also suggest that there has been limited prior
research on the moderating effect of host-country experience on the institutional
distance-subsidiary performance link. Because emerging markets are characterised by
a large informal/extra-legal economy and a greater variety of external stakeholders
that affect MNEs’ operations, we suggest that greater host-country experience is an
important aspect of the organisational learning process (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
Accordingly, with greater experience, subsidiaries will be better able to overcome the
disadvantages of institutional distance.
Third, we argue that, in general, research on the institutional distance-subsidiary
performance relationship can benefit from accounting for firm-level observations from a
larger cohort of home and host countries. Recent research highlights that by focusing on
a single home (developed) country, the validity of the institutional distance construct can
be undermined due to a greater conflation between ‘institutional distance’ and
‘institutional profile effects’ (van Hoorn and Maseland 2016), where ‘institutional
profile’ relates to the institutional environment of a particular home or host country
where firms are deeply embedded and face distinct opportunities and challenges (Meyer
et al. 2009). In their study, Gaur and Lu (2007) consider MNEs from a single (developed)
home country, i.e., Japan, and therefore, the variation in institutional distance between
Japan and the selected host countries is tantamount to variation in the institutional profile
of the host countries. The reason is that because institutional distance is calculated as the
difference between home and host countries’ institutional profile scores, the use of a
single developed home country makes a low institutional profile score for the host
country correspond to a high institutional distance with Japan, which makes it
impossible to determine whether the observed effects are due to weaker institutions in
the host country or due to the dissimilarity of the institutions between the host country
and the home country. In response to recent calls (van Hoorn and Maseland 2016) to
include a diverse group of countries in institutional distance research, our study also
aims to re-evaluate the existing findings on the institutional distance-subsidiary
performance relationship by including a wider array of home and host countries.
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Reflecting these limitations in prior research, our paper aims to address the
following important questions: (1) What is the effect of formal (regulatory)
institutional distance on the performance of MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries in emerging
markets? and (2) What are the moderating effects of ownership strategy and host-
country experience on the link between formal institutional distance and subsidiary
performance in the context of emerging markets?
We believe that by testing our hypotheses on the linkages among formal
institutional distance, ownership strategy, host-country experience and subsidiary
performance within the context of emerging markets, we make the following
contributions. First, we partially replicate Gaur and Lu (2007) model of the effect of
formal institutional distance on the performance of MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries and
the moderating effect of ownership strategy on this link. By doing so, we contribute
to a greater generalisation of the institutional distance-subsidiary performance link
within their model by using observations of subsidiaries of MNEs from 80 home
countries operating in 17 emerging market countries. As explained above, in
contrast to Gaur and Lu (2007) sample, our sample enables us to address an
important discussion related to the methodological construct of institutional distance
(van Hoorn and Maseland 2016) and to re-evaluate the existing findings on the
institutional distance-subsidiary performance relationship. In this process, we follow
the guidelines of a ‘good enough’ replication (Singh et al. 2003), i.e., we employ
constructs that are similar to those employed in Gaur and Lu (2007) study, although
our measurements of the constructs differ for some variables. Mainly, Gaur and Lu
(2007) focus on subsidiary survival, whereas our dependent variable is subsidiary
performance (measured by return on equity). Second, based on the extant literature
explaining the generic institutional characteristics in emerging markets, we provide
new theoretical arguments on the relationship between formal institutional distance
and subsidiary performance and on the moderating effect of ownership strategy and
host-country experience on this relationship. By doing so, we contribute to prior
research on the performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries in emerging markets that has
examined related issues such as the role of psychic distance (Dikova 2009), business
group affiliation (Chacar and Vissa 2005; Khanna and Rivkin 2001), managerial ties
and connections (Sheng et al. 2011), embeddedness (Sun et al. 2010), localisation
strategies (London and Hart 2004), and parent-subsidiary integration (Luo 2003).
In the following sections, we formulate our hypotheses, describe our data and
present our findings from 17 emerging markets. Finally, we discuss our results in
relation to Gaur and Lu’s (2007) findings in addition to other relevant research, and
we conclude our paper by highlighting our contributions and limitations and
suggesting important avenues for future research.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Scholars have emphasised that MNEs are affected by cross-country differences in
formal institutions, such as laws and regulations (and the enforcement thereof), and
by differences in informal institutions, such as the norms and cognitions arising
from cultural differences (Peng et al. 2008, 2009). Institutional theory posits that
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‘regulatory’ differences (in particular) between countries will increase the liabilities
of foreignness to MNEs and will increase the costs of learning the ‘rules of the
game’ (North 1990). Such differences arise from the varieties of business systems
among countries that affect the ways in which capital and labour power are
organised and controlled, economic exchanges and competing interests are
governed, and the nature and policies of the state affect economic activities, the
financial system and education and training systems. Qualitatively, institutions also
include the dominant beliefs concerning trust, authority and loyalty (Whitley
1992, 1998). Prior literature stresses the need for firms to conform to the nature and
quality of local institutions as a precondition for survival and performance (Xu and
Shenkar 2002). Because MNEs operate in multiple institutional settings, institu-
tional differences affect subsidiary control mechanisms (Harzing and Sorge 2003),
subsidiary staffing strategies (Gaur et al. 2007) and subsidiary work systems and
knowledge transfer (Saka 2004).
Within a general context, Gaur and Lu (2007) argue that there is an inverted-U
shaped relationship between regulatory institutional distance and subsidiary
survival, such that the survival rates at low levels of institutional distance increase
but decrease at high levels of institutional distance. The reason is that low levels of
institutional distance enable MNEs to gain from institutional arbitrage, i.e., new
environmental conditions may act as opportunities for MNEs to exploit their
ownership advantages. Although the unfamiliarity of new host institutions
necessitates learning and increases costs, these costs are marginal in comparison
to the potential benefits, leading to greater subsidiary survival rates. However, at
high levels of institutional distance, the costs of learning exceed the accrued
benefits, leading to disadvantages in relation to firms from similar institutions (Gaur
and Lu 2007).
2.1 Institutional Distance and MNEs’ Subsidiary Performance in Emerging
Markets
We argue that institutional conditions in emerging markets offer unique challenges
to MNEs from distant environments and, therefore, regardless of the level of
regulatory institutional distance (Gaur and Lu 2007), MNEs’ subsidiaries from
similar environments will outperform those from distant environments in emerging
markets. The reason is that, first, regulatory institutions in emerging markets are
characterised by complexity and continuous change, and these characteristics
increase the costs of learning for MNEs, even at low levels of institutional distance,
in relation to the potential benefits. For instance, regulations concerning MNEs in
emerging markets constantly shift from entry-level restrictions (such as controlling
the size, location, timing and partner selection of FDI projects) to restrictions at
detailed operational levels (such as controlling for component localisation, export
levels, distribution, worker unionisation, environmental protection, and accounting
standards) (Luo 2007). In many large emerging markets such as China and India,
regulations have shifted from national (i.e., federal) levels to regional (i.e.,
subnational) levels in recent years. Consequently, MNEs have had to interact with a
greater variety of institutional actors (Luo 2007; Meyer and Nguyen 2005). Firms
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from similar institutional settings (such as from other emerging markets) are better
equipped to address such complexities and have a clear advantage over subsidiaries
from distant environments.
Second, in emerging markets, business systems and governance structures that
affect ownership, control, industry collaboration, information gathering and
resource access are significantly different from those in developed countries and
from those in other developing countries with comparatively greater institutional
voids (Jakobsen and Torp 2001; Zhang and Whitley 2013). Firms from developed
contexts often depend on reliable information (e.g., about suitable partners, coping
with emergencies, addressing ambiguous laws) to devise their strategy, and such
information may not be easily available in emerging markets, resulting in negative
effects on subsidiary performance (Chacar and Vissa 2005). Furthermore, important
local resources such as natural resources, markets, and licences are preferentially
accessible to state-owned companies or influential business groups (or chaebols as
in Korea) due to the greater embeddedness of such organisations in socio-political
networks in many emerging markets (Jakobsen and Torp 2001; Khanna and Palepu
2000b, 2000a). However, despite the heterogeneity among emerging markets, in
general, most emerging markets are making improvements in building legitimate
business-government interfaces, controlling corruption and reducing bureaucracy
and red tape (Hoskisson et al. 2013). Scholars have found that more recently in
emerging markets, connections to politicians and managers in other related firms
have proven detrimental to foreign subsidiaries’ performance (Zhou et al. 2008).
Although such developments are advantageous to developed country-based MNEs,
they may increase the challenges for firms from other developing countries (with
greater institutional voids) that are likely to rely on deeply engrained relational
connections with the government to further their business interests. Firms from
similar institutional settings are likely to develop better capabilities to align their
business strategies with such complex and changing non-market expectations, and
they can more easily transfer these capabilities in other emerging markets compared
to firms from institutionally distant countries, resulting in competitive advantages.
Based on these arguments, we suggest the following:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries in emerging
markets will decrease with greater formal institutional distance.
2.2 The Moderating Effect of Ownership Strategy
Scholars have suggested that the negative effects of regulatory institutional distance
can be reduced via partnership with firms that are embedded in the host environment
(Delios and Beamish 2001; Delios and Henisz 2003). However, Gaur and Lu (2007)
argue that in distant regulatory institutional environments, the choice of a reliable
and trustworthy partner is a challenge in itself and the costs of monitoring and
coordinating with the partner exceed the benefits. In line with this argument,
empirically, they find that Japanese MNEs that tightly controlled their subsidiary
operations via full ownership in distant regulatory environments survived longer
than joint venture subsidiaries. We suggest that in the context of emerging markets,
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full ownership will increase not only the uncertainty in addressing unfamiliar
institutions but also the risk of appropriation of MNEs’ assets by the government or
other hostile pressure groups (Wright et al. 2005). This is due to the following
reasons.
First, scholars have suggested that due to the unavailability of publicly available
financial data and other information about indigenous firms in emerging markets,
the due diligence costs associated with full ownership strategies (such as
acquisitions or greenfield ventures) for firms from distant countries are higher,
ultimately negatively affecting subsidiary performance (Peng 2006). In contrast,
shared ownership in emerging markets has been argued to be important to firms
from institutionally distant countries while accessing critical ‘institutional
resources’ such as legitimacy and reputation (Meyer et al. 2009). Additionally,
because important local resources in emerging markets may be restricted to state-
owned companies and some influential business groups, partnerships with such
organisations have been found to be important drivers of MNEs’ subsidiary
performance (Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Lin et al. 2009; Peng 2003).
Second, scholars have emphasised the complementarity between the internal
assets and capabilities of MNEs (such as technological and management capabil-
ities) and the resources available externally in emerging markets (such as low-cost
natural or human resources) (Luo 2001). For this reason, institutional differences
can make various external stakeholders in emerging economies perceive MNEs as
being exploitative towards local resources in host countries (Child and Tsai 2005).
In such a situation, partnerships and alliances increase the level of trust that external
institutional actors in emerging economies place in MNEs. We suggest that a high
level of trust cannot be developed if MNEs pursue full ownership modes because
using these types of modes can be regarded as opportunistic behaviour on the part of
MNEs in emerging markets (Schoorman et al. 2007). Scholars have suggested that
partial ownership also better allows MNEs’ subsidiaries to protect their innovative
technology in emerging markets, where the enforcement of intellectual property-
related regulations is likely to be weaker (McGaughey et al. 2000). Based on the
above arguments, we argue the following:
H2: In emerging markets, the negative effect of formal institutional distance
on MNEs’ subsidiary performance is reduced with partial subsidiary
ownership.
2.3 The Moderating Effect of Host-Country Experience
Based on experiential learning theory (Johanson and Vahlne 1977), scholars have
suggested that with increased experience in the host country, subsidiaries of foreign
firms will learn how to address institutional differences and reduce their liabilities of
foreignness, (Fang et al. 2007; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Greater host-country
experience increases the scope for MNEs’ subsidiaries to be better equipped to
address unfamiliarity and relational hazards in the host country and to develop
social and political knowledge, leading to greater legitimacy in the new
environment (Gaur and Lu 2007). With increased experience, subsidiaries of
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foreign firms are also likely to improve their market-specific knowledge and offer
differentiated products, access local promotion channels, and accumulate local
reputation and product image (Shaver et al. 1997). We suggest that these arguments
can be extended to the context of emerging markets.
In this context, first, scholars have suggested that in emerging markets where a
variety of external stakeholders often have conflicting interests, greater experience
will enable subsidiaries of MNEs from distant institutional environments to identify
optimal areas of complementarity and cultivate relationships with the related local
actors (Luo and Peng 1999). Such embeddedness, as a potential outcome of host-
country experience, has been associated with increased subsidiary performance in
the context of emerging markets (Sun et al. 2010). For instance, MNEs’ subsidiaries
entering emerging markets often follow expensive universal codes of conduct such
as those prescribed by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) to satisfy
stakeholders’ expectations (Christmann and Taylor 2001). However, experienced
subsidiaries have been found to realise that adapting to locally accepted norms such
as complying with the Green Rating Project (in India), sponsoring activities (such as
education and healthcare) and engaging with local development organisations
allows MNEs to better communicate their practices to local stakeholders and gain
legitimacy, which can be associated with improved performance (Rettab et al.
2009).
Second, scholars have suggested that increased host-country experience enables
MNEs to effectively adapt their firm-specific intangible assets to the host country
institutional setting to ultimately improve subsidiary survival and profitability
(Delios and Beamish 2001; Gaur and Lu 2007). Specifically, most emerging
markets are characterised by a vast extra-legal economy that is characterised by
unregistered assets, tax evasion, and red tape-led corruption; and subsidiaries of
MNEs originating from institutionally distant developed countries face the time-
consuming and complex challenge of bridging the extra-legal and legal (or
formal) economies to drive positive subsidiary performance in these countries
(Prahalad and Hammond 2002). In this context, for instance, after several years of
operating in India, the British firm Unilever realised that adapting its product
strategies to ‘bottom of the pyramid’ issues was an important driver of its success
in India (London and Hart 2004). Unilever’s Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever
Limited, used a variety of local partners to distribute its products and also sought
consumer insights and preferences to develop new products. Ultimately, Unilever
was able to generate more than $1 billion from the low-income markets in India
alone (Ellison et al. 2002). Based on these arguments, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
H3: In emerging markets, the negative effect of formal institutional distance
on MNEs’ subsidiary performance is reduced with greater subsidiary
experience in the host country.
The Fig. 1 describes our theoretical framework.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Data Collection
We collected our data from Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database, which provided us
with MNEs’ subsidiary-level data over the 9-year period of 2004–2012. Our dataset
contains foreign owned firms in the following 17 emerging markets2—Chile, China,
Columbia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
Table 1 provides a full list of host and home countries represented by this dataset.
3.2 Measures
We measured MNEs’ subsidiary performance by return on equity (ROE), which is
our dependent variable. ROE has been used as a measure of firm performance in a
vast number of studies (e.g., Klarner and Raisch 2012; Zahra et al. 2000).
Our key explanatory variable is the formal institutional distance between the host
country of the subsidiary firm and the home country of the parent firm. Various
measures of institutional distance are available, such as the Dow index (Dow and
Karunaratna 2006), the Kaufmann index (Kaufmann et al. 2007), Hotho’s indices
(Hotho 2009), and indices from the International Country Risk Guide (Hahn et al.
Partial 
Ownership
Formal
Institutional
Distance
Subsidiary
Performance
 
Host-Country 
Experience
H2(+)
H3(+)
H1(-)
Fig. 1 Theoretical framework
2 These countries were selected based on the classification of emerging markets by four sources FTSE,
Goldman Sachs, Grant Thornton and the International Monetary Fund—and data availability.
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Table 1 List of countries used in the study
Host countries (17) Home countries (80)
Chile Argentina Luxembourg
China Australia Malaysia
Colombia Austria Malta
Czech Republic Bahrain Mexico
Egypt, Arab Rep. Belgium Morocco
Hungary Brazil Netherlands
India Bulgaria New Zealand
Indonesia Canada Norway
Malaysia Chile Oman
Mexico China Pakistan
Morocco Colombia Panama
Peru Costa Rica Peru
Philippines Croatia Philippines
Poland Czech Republic Poland
Russian Federation Denmark Portugal
South Africa Egypt, Arab Rep. Qatar
Turkey Estonia Romania
Finland Russian Federation
France Samoa
Germany Saudi Arabia
Greece Serbia
Guatemala Singapore
Hong Kong Sar, China Slovak Republic
Hungary Slovenia
Iceland South Africa
India Spain
Indonesia Sweden
Iran, Islamic Rep. Switzerland
Ireland Syrian Arab Republic
Israel Taiwan, China
Italy Thailand
Japan Turkey
Kazakhstan Ukraine
Kenya United Arab Emirates
Korea, Dem. Rep. United Kingdom
Korea, Rep. United States
Kuwait Uruguay
Latvia Uzbekistan
Lebanon Venezuela, Rb
Lithuania Vietnam
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2009), in addition to the World Competitiveness Yearbook used by Gaur and Lu
(2007). Because we focus on emerging markets, we operationalise formal
institutional distance using Kaufmann’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, which
have been most popularly used in this context (Dikova 2009; Kolstad and Wiig
2012). For each country, six dimensions of governance, i.e., Voice and Account-
ability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), Government
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of
Corruption (CC), are reported in the Worldwide Governance Indicators. For each
governance indicator, we calculate the distance between the host country and the
home country, and we use these six measures of institutional distance as our main
explanatory variables.
We measure ownership strategy (our first moderator) using a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the subsidiary is wholly owned (i.e., 100 % ownership)
and 0 if the firm is partially owned with at least a 10 % stake. This measure is
consistent with Gaur and Lu (2007)’s measure. Finally, we measure host-country
experience (our second moderator) using the subsidiary’s age in the host country,
i.e., the number of years since the firm was incorporated in the given host country.
We believe that age is a good measure of host-country experience from a subsidiary
perspective for both greenfield and acquisition-type investments because, when an
MNE forms a subsidiary by acquiring a local firm, the age of the local firm adds to
the subsidiary’s host-country experience because the local firm is already embedded
in the host country’s institutional context. In contrast, when a subsidiary is formed
through a greenfield investment, the subsidiary is relatively new to the institutional
context.
Guided by previous literature and empirical evidence, we include several control
variables. To control for the effect of informal institutional (cultural) distance
between the host and the home country, we include two measures, i.e., the language
distance (LDIST) and the religious distance (RDIST) between the host country and
the home country. Among the firm-level determinants of firm performance, the
firm’s size and age are the two most widely used demographic characteristics of
firms (Klarner and Raisch 2012); therefore, we include firm size and age. The
number of patents registered under a firm is often used as a measure of the
intangible assets that the firm possesses (Riahi-Belkaoui 2003), and past empirical
studies show that patents have a significant positive impact on firm performance
(Bloom and van Reenen 2002). Therefore, we also include the number of patents of
a firm as a control variable. Existing literature shows that the board and ownership
structure can have implications for firm performance (Barth et al. 2005; Core et al.
1999); therefore, we include the number of directors on the board and whether the
subsidiary is a publicly listed firm as control variables.
In addition to the firm-level determinants, various factors in the host country can
aid or inhibit firm performance. Therefore, we also control for the host country’s
economic growth rate, infrastructure, level of human capital and income tax rate
(Table 2).
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Our baseline specification takes the following form:
ROEit ¼ b0 þ b1IDISTjkt þ b2LSIZEit þ b3 AGEit þ b4NDIRi þ b5PATENTSi
þ b6PUBLICi þ b7WOSi þ b8GDPGjt þ b9INFRAjk þ b10TAXjt
þ b11HCjt þ b12LDISTjk þ b13RDISTjk þ lj þ lk þ dt þ V þ eijt
Table 2 Variable description, measurement and sources
Variable Description/Measurement Data source
ROE Return on Equity Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database
LSIZE Log value of firm’s sales
AGE Firm age
AGEOLDEST Age of the oldest firm of all of the firms owned
by the MNE in the focal subsidiary’s host
country.
NDIR Number of directors
PATENTS Number of patents
PUBLIC A binary variable that takes the value of one if
the firm is a public firm and zero otherwise.
WOS A binary variable that takes the value of one if
the firm is a wholly owned subsidiary and zero
if the firm is partially owned with at least a
10 % stake.
VA Voice and Accountability Worldwide Governance Indicators
PS Political Stability and Absence of Violence
GE Government Effectiveness
RQ Regulatory Quality
RL Rule of Law
CC Control of Corruption
GDPG GDP growth rate of the host country World Development Indicators
INFRA Telephone lines per 100 people in the host
country
TAX Total tax rate (% of commercial profits) in the
host country
HC Secondary school enrolment (% gross) of the
host country
LDIST 5-point scale based on the incidence (p) of the
home country’s dominant language(s) in the
host country
5 = p\ 1 %; 4 = 1 % B p\ 5 %;
3 = 5 % B p\ 50 %
2 = 50 % B p\ 90 %; 1 = p C 90 %
Dow and Karunaratna (2004)
RDIST 5-point scale based on the incidence (p) of the
home country’s dominant religion(s) in the
host country
5 = p\ 1 %; 4 = 1 % B p\ 5 %;
3 = 5 % B p\ 50 %
2 = 50 % B p\ 90 %; 1 = p[ 90 %
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where subscripts i, j, k and t refer to the firm, host country, home country and
observation year, respectively. ROEit is the return on equity of firm i at time t.
IDISTjkt is the institutional distance (formal) between host country j and home
country k. LSIZEit is the log value of the firm’s sales. AGEit, NDIRi and PATENTSi
are the firm’s age, number of directors, and number of patents, respectively.
PUBLICi and WOSi are dummy variables; the first variable captures whether the
firm is a public firm, and the second variable captures whether the firm is a fully
owned subsidiary. GDPGjt is the GDP growth rate of the host country. TELjt is a
measure of infrastructure and is represented by the number of telephone lines per
100 people in the host country. TAXjt is the total tax rate (% of commercial profits)
in the host country. HCjt is the level of human capital of the host country and is
represented by the secondary school enrolment rate (% gross) of the host country.
LDIST is the language distance, measured as the incidence of home country j’s
dominant language(s) in host country i; this indicator is a five-point scale that
measures the proportion of the population in the host country that is able to speak
the major language(s) of the home country. RDIST is the religious distance, mea-
sured as the incidence of the home country’s dominant religion(s) in the host
country; this indicator is a five-point scale that measures the proportion of the
population in the host country that belongs to the same religion(s) of the home
country. lj, lk and dt are host country-specific, home country-specific and year-
specific effects, respectively. V captures industry-specific effects. Because unob-
served industry-specific effects can affect firm profitability, industry fixed effects
are included for a total of 86 sectors.3 eijt is the white noise disturbance term. We
expect b2, b5, b8, b9, and b11 to be positive and b10, b12 and b13 to be negative.
Given the mixed nature of the existing empirical results, we expect b3, b4 and b6 to
be indecisive a priori.
4 Results
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3. It can be
observed that the worldwide governance indicators used as measures of institutional
distance are highly correlated with each other (as expected), but this is not a
problem because we have used each indicator in a separate regression model.
We estimate our specification based on a random effects model (Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) estimator) in a four-dimensional panel data framework, where
we control for host country-specific, home country-specific, year-specific and
industry-specific fixed effects. All estimations are estimated with robust standard
errors to control for heteroscedasticity. The estimated results of the base line
specification are presented in Table 4.
With regard to the direct effect of formal institutional distance on MNEs’
subsidiary performance, models 1.1 through 1.6 show that the estimated coefficients
of all six formal institutional distance variables are negative, of which three, i.e.,
3 Industry fixed effects are defined at the two-digit sectoral classification based on the NACE Rev two
classification.
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Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law, are significant. With
regard to the moderating effect of ownership strategy on the formal institutional
distance-subsidiary performance link, we split the sample based on the ownership
status (wholly owned subsidiaries vs. partially owned subsidiaries) and repeat the
estimations. The results are reported in Table 5.
For the wholly owned subsidiaries (models 2.1 through 2.6), all six institutional
distance measures have a negative sign, of which four, i.e., Control of Corruption,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability, are significant. In
contrast, for the partially owned subsidiaries (models 3.1 through 3.6), all six
measures of the institutional distance variables are highly insignificant. These
results show that institutional distance has a pronounced negative impact on firm
performance for wholly owned subsidiaries compared to partially owned
subsidiaries.
To observe the moderating effect of host-country experience on the formal
institutions distance-subsidiary performance relationship, we interact the institu-
tional distance (IDIST) with the age (AGE) of the firm, and the estimated results are
reported in Table 6.
In Table 6, the coefficient of IDIST is negative and also significant in most cases
(models 4.1 through 4.6), indicating that institutional distance has a pronounced
negative effect on new firms. The interaction term (IDIST * AGE) is positive in all
estimations except that with Voice and Accountability (VA), and the interaction
term is significant in the first three estimations. These results indicate that the
negative effect of institutional distance on firm performance diminishes with greater
host-country experience.
With regard to the effect of the control variables regarding informal institutional
distance, LDIST and RDIST are negative and significant in most of the estimations.
With regard to the firm-level control variables, the coefficient of LSIZE has the
expected positive sign and is highly significant. PATENTS has the expected positive
sign and is significant in all cases except for partially owned subsidiaries. This result
Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Correlation coefficients
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 ROE 40616 26.726 96.564 -997.75 996.29
2 CC 40616 1.507 0.737 0.00 3.60 0.05
3 GE 40616 1.085 0.561 0.00 2.80 0.06 0.86
4 PS 40616 0.766 0.730 0.00 3.90 0.06 0.53 0.67
5 RQ 40616 0.851 0.622 0.00 3.10 0.07 0.77 0.85 0.75
6 RL 40616 1.222 0.685 0.00 2.90 0.08 0.85 0.92 0.74 0.89
7 VA 40616 0.909 0.839 0.00 3.30 0.05 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.81
8 LSIZE 40616 2.095 1.662 0.00 9.04 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.18
9 AGE 40616 11.013 10.295 0.00 262.00 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.29
10 NDIR 40616 2.603 3.424 0.00 43.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.35 0.29
11 PATENTS 40616 1.070 36.519 0.00 2798.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.07
12 PUBLIC 40616 0.144 0.351 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.40 0.03
13 GDPG 40616 4.304 4.351 -7.82 14.20 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.23 0.36 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01
14 INFRA 40616 24.736 5.669 2.63 33.86 0.07 0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.14 0.19 -0.14 -0.27 -0.24 -0.05 -0.44 -0.03
15 TAX 40616 51.335 11.544 24.50 84.20 -0.01 0.26 0.32 0.56 0.45 0.40 0.58 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.41 -0.12
16 HC 40616 90.981 8.825 49.59 101.89 -0.04 -0.40 -0.45 -0.61 -0.66 -0.53 -0.70 -0.22 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 -0.40 0.16 -0.66
17 WOS 40616 0.626 0.484 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.07
18 LDIST 40616 4.771 0.580 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 0.16 -0.16 0.11 0.06
19 RDIST 40616 2.638 0.986 1.00 5.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 0.03 -0.12 0.20 0.11 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.23 -0.10 0.23 -0.40 -0.03 0.19
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Table 4 Institutional distance and subsidiary performance (total sample)
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
CC -5.832*
(3.435)
GE -0.985
(3.493)
PS -0.994
(2.089)
RQ -8.439**
(3.304)
RL -5.881*
(3.379)
VA -5.751
(3.931)
LSIZE 9.184***
(0.655)
9.167***
(0.654)
9.168***
(0.654)
9.175***
(0.654)
9.166***
(0.655)
9.162***
(0.654)
AGE -0.680***
(0.0881)
-0.677***
(0.0880)
-0.677***
(0.0881)
-0.681***
(0.0882)
-0.680***
(0.0881)
-0.679***
(0.0881)
NDIR -1.471***
(0.327)
-1.462***
(0.327)
-1.465***
(0.327)
-1.468***
(0.327)
-1.474***
(0.327)
-1.457***
(0.326)
PATENTS 0.0785***
(0.0205)
0.0784***
(0.0205)
0.0784***
(0.0206)
0.0784***
(0.0204)
0.0785***
(0.0205)
0.0783***
(0.0206)
PUBLIC -19.12***
(3.529)
-19.15***
(3.527)
-19.11***
(3.530)
-19.19***
(3.526)
-19.14***
(3.528)
-19.15***
(3.528)
GDPG 1.304***
(0.262)
1.371***
(0.260)
1.360***
(0.261)
1.324***
(0.258)
1.392***
(0.255)
1.371***
(0.256)
INFRA 0.697**
(0.283)
0.615**
(0.281)
0.618**
(0.280)
0.707**
(0.281)
0.726**
(0.286)
0.723**
(0.293)
TAX -0.431**
(0.191)
-0.420**
(0.190)
-0.419**
(0.191)
-0.492**
(0.194)
-0.415**
(0.190)
-0.452**
(0.193)
HC 0.152
(0.232)
0.0707
(0.226)
0.0727
(0.228)
0.0271
(0.227)
0.108
(0.227)
0.0676
(0.226)
WOS -4.053**
(1.760)
-4.060**
(1.760)
-4.055**
(1.761)
-4.014**
(1.760)
-4.029**
(1.760)
-4.108**
(1.760)
LDIST -4.344**
(2.088)
-4.827**
(2.081)
-4.694**
(2.111)
-4.012*
(2.081)
-4.162**
(2.097)
-4.314**
(2.118)
RDIST -2.738*
(1.594)
-2.692*
(1.592)
-2.696*
(1.595)
-2.628*
(1.596)
-2.750*
(1.597)
-2.395
(1.599)
Constant 45.61
(54.43)
49.66
(54.64)
49.10
(54.55)
65.38
(55.18)
49.47
(54.55)
61.83
(55.67)
N 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616
R2 0.0452 0.0450 0.0450 0.0453 0.0452 0.0452
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
For reasons of brevity, country-specific fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects and industry-specific fixed
effects are not reported
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is in line with the notion that full ownership enables parent firms to optimally utilise
their intangible resources, ultimately having a positive impact on subsidiary
performance. Interestingly, AGE has a negative coefficient (and is highly
significant), which shows that the firm’s performance deteriorates with age. NDIR
and PUBLIC have negative and significant coefficients. This finding could be due to
the larger overheads associated with maintaining a large board and being a public
company. WOS is negative and significant in all estimations, which is in contrast
with the finding by Gaur and Lu (2007), who argue and find evidence for a positive
Table 6 Institutional distance and subsidiary performance (moderating effect of host-country
experience)
IDIST = CC IDIST = GE IDIST = PS IDIST = RQ IDIST = RL IDIST = VA
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
IDIST -7.981**
(3.784)
-3.956
(3.894)
-4.927**
(2.489)
-10.30***
(3.719)
-7.136**
(3.601)
-5.310
(4.157)
IDIST *
AGE
0.215*
(0.122)
0.346**
(0.147)
0.355***
(0.0971)
0.190
(0.136)
0.151
(0.124)
-0.0509
(0.112)
AGE -1.037***
(0.217)
-1.119***
(0.209)
-1.057***
(0.137)
-0.878***
(0.159)
-0.905***
(0.201)
-0.628***
(0.134)
LSIZE 9.177***
(0.655)
9.167***
(0.655)
9.201***
(0.655)
9.173***
(0.654)
9.163***
(0.655)
9.166***
(0.654)
NDIR -1.479***
(0.327)
-1.483***
(0.326)
-1.603***
(0.329)
-1.489***
(0.327)
-1.480***
(0.326)
-1.456***
(0.326)
PATENTS 0.0773***
(0.0212)
0.0771***
(0.0214)
0.0762***
(0.0218)
0.0763***
(0.0218)
0.0784***
(0.0206)
0.0783***
(0.0207)
PUBLIC -18.86***
(3.546)
-18.88***
(3.539)
-18.47***
(3.537)
-18.97***
(3.551)
-18.92***
(3.550)
-19.19***
(3.535)
GDPG 1.306***
(0.262)
1.382***
(0.260)
1.357***
(0.261)
1.339***
(0.257)
1.396***
(0.255)
1.365***
(0.256)
INFRA 0.667**
(0.282)
0.596**
(0.280)
0.538*
(0.281)
0.700**
(0.280)
0.697**
(0.286)
0.727**
(0.292)
TAX -0.419**
(0.191)
-0.390**
(0.190)
-0.377**
(0.192)
-0.468**
(0.194)
-0.400**
(0.191)
-0.461**
(0.194)
HC 0.120
(0.232)
0.0556
(0.226)
0.0265
(0.229)
0.00996
(0.227)
0.0890
(0.228)
0.0787
(0.228)
WOS -4.128**
(1.762)
-4.155**
(1.761)
-4.183**
(1.759)
-4.040**
(1.761)
-4.093**
(1.763)
-4.100**
(1.760)
LDIST -4.384**
(2.087)
-4.962**
(2.082)
-4.951**
(2.111)
-3.970*
(2.078)
-4.268**
(2.103)
-4.288**
(2.119)
RDIST -2.776*
(1.593)
-2.728*
(1.592)
-2.771*
(1.596)
-2.634*
(1.596)
-2.758*
(1.596)
-2.405
(1.600)
Constant 50.97
(54.43)
54.90
(54.65)
57.78
(54.65)
69.03
(55.23)
53.20
(54.60)
60.31
(55.85)
N 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616 40,616
R2 0.0453 0.0454 0.0457 0.0455 0.0454 0.0452
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
For brevity, country-specific, year-specific and industry-specific fixed effects are not reported
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performance effect of wholly owned subsidiaries. Our result is in line with our
argument that full ownership may not be the best strategy in the context of emerging
markets. Turning to the country-level control variables, GDPG and INFRA are
positive and significant, implying that the economic growth rate and the level of
infrastructure in the host country have a positive effect on firm performance. TAX is
negative and significant, confirming that the tax rate in the host country can have a
negative effect on subsidiary profits. Although the level of human capital in the host
country (HC) has the expected positive sign in most cases, it is not significant at the
10 % level.
Given that Gaur and Lu (2007) examine the curvilinear effects of institutional
distance on MNEs’ subsidiary performance, we also test for this possibility in the
context of emerging markets (see Table 7). However, we find that the curvilinear
effects are insignificant.
To test the robustness of our results, we also repeat the regressions with different
cut-off points (i.e., 90 and 95 %) to differentiate partial and full ownership (see
Table 8). We find that doing so did not significantly change our original results. We
also test for an alternative measure of host-country experience. Because an MNE
may have multiple subsidiaries in the host country4 and it is possible that an MNE
can gain experience in the host country’s institutional context through its other
sibling subsidiaries in the same host country, in our alternative measure,
AGEOLDEST, we calculate the host-country experience based on the age of the
oldest firm out of all of the firms owned by the MNE in the focal subsidiary’s host
country. We then repeat the regressions using this variable (see Table 9). We do not
find any significant differences from our original findings. MNEs are often accused
of using transfer pricing to shift profits to tax havens to minimise their overall tax
liability. Because we use an accounting-based measure of performance (i.e., ROE),
it is important to address this issue. Based on 11 lists of tax havens compiled by
Chavagneux et al. (2010), Haberly and Wo´jcik (2015) have produced a list of
countries that have 75, 50 and 25 % levels of agreement on tax haven definition. We
use the list of countries with a 75 % level of agreement, i.e., countries that appear in
at least 75 % of the lists (i.e., 9 out of the 11 lists), and then repeat our regressions
after excluding these countries from our sample.5 All of our results remain intact.
We believe that this exercise will minimise any bias introduced by the issue of
transfer pricing.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study was inspired by the increasing development of formal institutions in
emerging markets and the implications thereof for existing theoretical and empirical
insights on the institutional distance-subsidiary performance link. In regard to the
direct effect of formal institutional distance on subsidiary performance, our findings
4 Our sample consists of a total of 5647 unique parent firm-host country pairs, and in 1133 of those pairs,
the parent firm has more than one subsidiary in the host country.
5 For reasons of brevity, we do not report these results; however, they are available upon request.
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from 17 emerging markets provide support for our hypothesis 1, in which we argue
that greater institutional distance will have a negative impact on subsidiary
performance. Our results (Table 4) show that formal institutional distance is
significantly negatively associated with MNEs’ subsidiary performance in emerging
markets. Therefore, we suggest that emerging markets constitute a setting where the
differences arising from MNEs’ home- and host-country regulatory environments
increase the ‘liabilities of foreignness’ (Kostova 1999; Kostova et al. 2008; Kostova
and Zaheer 1999) for firms from both less-developed and developed countries and
have negative implications for the performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries operating in
these markets. Our results provide alternative insights in relation to prior studies that
have argued and found evidence for the curvilinear effects of regulative institutional
distance in a general international context (i.e., not limited to emerging economy
contexts) (Gaur and Lu 2007) and positive effects of regulative institutional distance
in specific emerging market regions such as Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Dikova
2009). Therefore, our study suggests that emerging markets constitute a unique
context where the potential opportunities arising from differences in institutions do
not directly result in a competitive advantage for firms from distant environments.
Our study also examines the moderating effects of ownership strategy and host-
country experience on the relationship between formal institutional distance and
subsidiary performance in emerging markets. With regard to the moderating effect
of ownership strategy on the formal institutional distance-subsidiary performance
link, our findings show that the negative effect of institutional distance on subsidiary
performance is higher for firms with full ownership in emerging markets and that
the negative effect is insignificant for firms with partial ownership, thus supporting
our hypothesis 2. Our finding on this moderating effect in the context of emerging
markets contrasts with prior studies conducted in a general context where the wholly
owned option has been found to improve subsidiary survival in institutionally
distant contexts (e.g., Gaur and Lu 2007). We thus provide alternative explanations
in relation to these findings obtained in a general context (i.e., not specific to
emerging markets)6 by examining the context of emerging markets.
Finally, regarding the moderating effect of host-country experience, our
empirical results support our hypothesis 3, in which we argue that with greater
host-country experience, subsidiaries will be able to mitigate the negative effect of
institutional distance on performance. Table 6 shows that institutional distance has a
pronounced negative effect on new firms and that this negative effect decreases with
the increase in subsidiary age. Although previous studies (not limited to the context
of emerging markets) have emphasised that host-country experience is likely to
reduce the ‘liabilities of foreignness’ associated with institutional distance (Delios
and Beamish 2001; Gaur and Lu 2007; Luo and Peng 1999), we are the first to
empirically test this possibility and to provide supporting evidence that host-country
experience will improve foreign subsidiaries’ performance in institutionally distant
environments. We assert that with greater learning and experience, foreign
subsidiaries from distant environments will be able to gain legitimacy advantages
6 In contrast to our study, Gaur and Lu (2007) examine subsidiary survival, and their sample is limited to
one home country, i.e., Japan.
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by embedding within social and political frameworks in host countries, eventually
resulting in improved subsidiary performance outcomes.
Among our control variables, an interesting observation is that our informal
institutional distance variables (LDIST and RDIST) are consistently and signif-
icantly negatively associated with subsidiary performance (see Tables 4, 5 and 6).
Our finding supports previously found arguments on the negative association
between psychic distance and subsidiary performance in single emerging market
countries such as China (Carlsson et al. 2005). Our finding also contrasts with prior
studies that have argued that cultural and psychic distance is a positive driver of
MNEs’ foreign affiliates’ performance in other contexts, such as in the global retail
industry (Evans and Mavondo 2002; Evans et al. 2008) and among foreign
subsidiaries in specific emerging market regions such as Central and Eastern Europe
(Dikova 2009). Thus, our study, conducted in 17 emerging markets, provides
alternative evidence in relation to the previously found explanations of why greater
cultural distances are positively associated with subsidiary performance, and it
contributes to the on-going debate on the psychic distance paradox (O’Grady and
Lane 1996).
Despite these important contributions, we believe that our study has some
limitations that can be addressed in future research. One important limitation of this
study is that we focus on only the objective aspects of subsidiary performance (i.e.,
the return on equity) and do not include subjective factors such as improvements in
product development and managerial perceptions of critical success factors being
achieved. However, there is a consensus that the objective aspects reflect the
subjective aspects (Lumpkin and Dess 2001). Nevertheless, we suggest that future
research can include survey methods to combine both subjective and objective
aspects of subsidiary performance. Second, due to data limitations, we focus on only
the macro aspects of subsidiary strategy, and we are not able to account for the
micro aspects of organisational behaviour that drive firm performance. Research on
the microfoundations of firms’ dynamic capabilities—i.e., processes, routines,
paths, organizational structures, decision rules, and disciplines—has argued that
these are important drivers of the performance of firms (Felin et al. 2012; Foss and
Lindenberg 2013; Teece 2007), including MNEs (e.g., Augier and Teece 2007; Foss
and Pedersen 2004). We suggest that future research can combine quantitative
methods with qualitative evidence to provide deeper insights into the micro aspects
of subsidiary strategy and performance. Finally, the measure of formal institutional
distance that we used in our study has been argued to capture only the effectiveness
of institutions that are ‘external’ to the firm (such as the effectiveness of the
government in controlling corruption, protecting property rights etc.) and to ignore
the institutional factors that are ‘internal’ to the firm, such as differences between
business systems (Whitley 1998; Zhang and Whitley 2013). Although scholars have
been developing new measures of institutional distance based on Whitley’s work
(e.g., Hotho 2009; Hotho and Pedersen 2012), to date, these measures have focussed
on the European context and have not been extended to include several emerging
market countries. Future research on emerging markets can therefore contribute to
developing these new measures of institutional comparison, which can potentially
lead to new insights into the relationship between institutional distance and
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subsidiary performance. Despite these limitations, we suggest that this study
enhances our understanding of the link between institutional distance and subsidiary
performance and addresses the growing need for understanding the intersection
among institutional distance, host-country experience, ownership strategy and
subsidiary performance.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
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